Background: Limited evidence exists comprehensively assessing physical fitness attributes, physical activity behaviors, nutritional habits, and nutritional knowledge according to sex in basketball players during early adolescence. Insight of this nature could be used to optimize the training process and lifestyles in young basketball players.Objective: To compare physical fitness attributes, physical activity levels, nutritional habits, and nutritional knowledge between elite male and female basketball players under 14 years of age.Methods: Twenty-three U-14 basketball players from the same elite basketball academy participated in (...) this study. Physical fitness attributes were assessed using a basketball-specific test battery, while physical activity levels, nutritional habits, and nutritional knowledge were assessed using questionnaires.Results: Male players exhibited better physical fitness in all tests. Of note, a high proportion of players declared never or only sometimes eating fruit and vegetables. In addition, relatively poor nutritional knowledge was evident in all players with the group correctly answering <50% of nutritional questions overall and according to sex.Conclusion: These findings emphasize the necessity to perform individualized prescription of training stimuli across sexes to optimize the physical preparedness and development of youth basketball players. Additionally, strategies such as nutrition-focused education interventions may be necessary in this population given the low consumption of fruits and vegetables, as well as the poor nutritional knowledge observed in players. (shrink)

It is often thought that bets on the truth of known propositions become irrational if the losing costs are high enough. This is typically taken to count against the view that knowledge involves assigning credence 1. I argue that the irrationality of such extreme bets can be explained by considering the interactions between the agent and the bookmaker. More specifically, the agent’s epistemic perspective is altered by the fact that the bookmaker proposes that unusual type of bet. Among other things, (...) being willing to offer a bet with unnecessarily harmful losing costs is likely to undermine the baseline level of trustworthiness required for it to be rational to engage in betting exchanges. This sort of explanation does not require granting either that we assign credence lower than 1 to known propositions or that knowledge is sensitive to practical stakes. Moreover, I show that, in our ordinary lives, we frequently perform actions that we know would be disastrous if certain conditions did not obtain. This behaviour can be seen as a form of implicit extreme betting and, nevertheless, it is often rational. (shrink)

It is widely held that there is a distinctive norm of assertion. A plausible idea is that there is an analogous, perhaps weaker, norm for indirect communication via implicatures. I argue against this type of proposal. My claim is that the norm of assertion is a social norm governing public updates to the conversational record. Off the record implicatures are not subject to social norms of this type. I grant that, as happens in general with intentional actions, off the record (...) communicative acts may be subject to normative assessments on different levels (for instance, regarding their moral or prudential appropriateness). However, such assessments do not generate distinctive norms that apply to all cases of implicature. (shrink)

I argue that if there are nondisabled reasons to believe p, then there cannot be nondisabled reasons to believe something incompatible with p. I first defend a restricted version of the view, which applies only to situations where the relevant agent has complete evidence. Then, I argue for a generalized version of the view, which holds regardless of the agent's evidence. As a related result, I show that, given plausible assumptions, there cannot be nondisabled reasons to believe something false.

Higher‐order evidence can make an agent doubt the reliability of her reasoning. When this happens, it seems rational for the agent to adopt a cautious attitude towards her original conclusion, even in cases where the higher‐order evidence is misleading and the agent's original reasons were actually perfectly good. One may think that recoiling to a cautious attitude in the face of misleading self‐doubt involves a failure to properly respond to one's reasons. My aim is to show that this is not (...) so. My proposal is that (misleading) higher‐order evidence can undermine the agent's possession of her first‐order reasons, constituting what I call a dispossessing defeater. After acquiring the higher‐order evidence, the agent is no longer in a position to rely competently on the relevant first‐order considerations as reasons for her original conclusion, so that such reasons stop being available to her (even if they remain as strong as in the absence of the higher‐order evidence). In this way, an agent with misleading higher‐order evidence can adopt a cautious stance towards her original conclusion, while properly responding to the set of reasons that she possesses–a set that is reduced due to the acquisition of higher‐order dispossessing defeaters. (shrink)

Success semantics is a theory of content that characterizes the truth-conditions of mental representations in terms of the success-conditions of the actions derived from them. Nanay : 151-165, 2013) and Dokic and Engel have revised this theory in order to defend it from the objections that assailed its previous incarnations. I argue that both proposals have seemingly decisive flaws. More specifically, these revised versions of the theory fail to deal adequately with the open-ended possibility of unforeseen obstacles for the success (...) of our actions. I suggest that the problem of ignored obstacles undermines success semantics quite generally, including alternative formulations such as Blackburn’s. (shrink)

Teleosemantic theories aspire to develop a naturalistic account of intentional agency and thought by appeal to biological teleology. In particular, most versions of teleosemantics study the emergence of intentionality in terms of biological purposes introduced by Darwinian evolution. The aim of this paper is to argue that the sorts of biological purposes identified by these evolutionary approaches do not allow for a satisfactory account of intentionality. More precisely, I claim that such biological purposes should be attributed to reproductive chains or (...) lineages, rather than to individual traits or organisms, whereas the purposes underlying intentional agency and thought are typically attributed to individuals. In the last part of the paper I suggest that related difficulties are also faced, despite appearances, by accounts of intentionality relying on alternative organizational approaches to biological teleology. (shrink)

I argue that if there are nondisabled reasons to believe p, then there cannot be nondisabled reasons to believe something incompatible with p. I first defend a restricted version of the view, which applies only to situations where the relevant agent has complete evidence. Then, I argue for a generalized version of the view, which holds regardless of the agent's evidence. As a related result, I show that, given plausible assumptions, there cannot be nondisabled reasons to believe something false.

Food choices are a key determinant of dietary intake, with brain regions, such as the mesolimbic and prefrontal cortex maturing at differential rates into adulthood. More needs to be understood about developmental changes in healthy and unhealthy food perceptions and preference. We investigated how food perceptions and preference vary as a function of age and how food attributes impact age-related changes. One hundred thirty-nine participants completed computerized tasks to rate high-calorie and low-calorie food cues for taste, health, and liking, followed (...) by 100 binary food choices based on each participant’s ratings. Dietary self-control was considered successful when the healthier food was chosen. Self-control success ratio was the proportion of success trials over total number of choices. Beta-weights for health and taste were calculated as each attribute’s influence on food preference. Adiposity measurements included BMI z-score and waist-to-height ratio. High-calorie foods were rated more tasty and less healthy with increasing age. Older participants liked high-calorie foods more, and β-taste was associated with age. Significant age-by-WHtR interactions were observed for health and taste ratings of high-calorie foods, β-taste, and marginally for preference of high-calorie foods. Stratifying by WHtR, we found age-related increases in taste and preference ratings of high-calorie foods in the high WHtR group alone. In contrast, age-related decreases in health ratings of high-calorie foods were significant in the low WHtR group alone. Age and β-taste were significantly associated in the high WHtR group and only marginally significant with low WHtR. Although participants rated low-calorie foods as less tasty and less healthy with increasing age, there was no association between age and preference for low-calorie foods. Participants made faster food choices with increasing age regardless of WHtR, with a significant age-by-WHtR interaction on reaction time. There were no age-related effects in self-control success ratio and β-health. These results suggest that individual differences in age and central adiposity play an important role in preference for high-calorie foods, and a higher importance of food tastiness in food choice may contribute to greater preference for high-calorie foods with increasing age. (shrink)

I argue for the possibility of the thesis that metaphors are indispensable for grasping and expressing certain propositions. I defend this possibility against the objection that, if metaphors express propositions, once these propositions are identified they should be specifiable by non‐metaphorical means. I argue that this objection loses its strength if one adopts a Wittgensteinian, particularist view of thought, according to which grasping a propositional thought requires the ongoing exercise of a suitable skill often not characterizable by algorithmic rules. Within (...) this particularist framework, thus, it becomes possible that metaphorical skills have an indispensable role in cognition and communication. (shrink)

AI systems are bringing an augmentation of human capabilities to shape the world. They may also drag a replacement of human conscience in large chunks of life. AI systems can be designed to leave moral control in human hands, to obstruct or diminish that moral control, or even to prevent it, replacing human morality with pre-packaged or developed ‘solutions’ by the ‘intelligent’ machine itself. Artificial Intelligent systems (AIS) are increasingly being used in multiple applications and receiving more attention from the (...) public and private organisations. The purpose of this article is to offer a mapping of the technological architectures that support AIS, under the specific focus of the moral agency. Through a literature research and reflection process, the following areas are covered: a brief introduction and review of the literature on the topic of moral agency; an analysis using the BDI logic model (Bratman 1987); an elemental review of artificial ‘reasoning’ architectures in AIS; the influence of the data input and the data quality; AI systems’ positioning in decision support and decision making scenarios; and finally, some conclusions are offered about regarding the potential loss of moral control by humans due to AIS. This article contributes to the field of Ethics and Artificial Intelligence by providing a discussion for developers and researchers to understand how and under what circumstances the ‘human subject’ may, totally or partially, lose moral control and ownership over AI technologies. The topic is relevant because AIS often are not single machines but complex networks of machines that feed information and decisions into each other and to human operators. The detailed traceability of input-process-output at each node of the network is essential for it to remain within the field of moral agency. Moral agency is then at the basis of our system of legal responsibility, and social approval is unlikely to be obtained for entrusting important functions to complex systems under which no moral agency can be identified. (shrink)

We present an inferentialist account of collective rationality and intentionality, according to which beliefs and other intentional states are understood in terms of the normative statuses attributed to, and undertaken by, the participants of a discursive practice—namely, their discursive or practical commitments and entitlements. Although these statuses are instituted by the performances and attitudes of the agents, they are not identified with any physical or psychological entity, process or relation. Therefore, we argue that inferentialism allows us to talk of collective (...) intentionality and agency without needing to posit the existence of any sort of collective psychology or mind. (shrink)

Los cimientos de una sociedad racional en Horkheimer parten de la premisa de hacer de la filosofía social una opción por la Teoría Crítica. Por ello [1] se desarrolla una interpretación dialéctica de lo social entre la filosofía y las teorías de las ciencias sociales, desde la categoría del materialismo interdisciplinario. [2] Caracterizar una época en estado de indigencia inicia definiendo la Ilustración como un proceso de desencantamiento del mundo que reduce la realidad humana en el signo del dominio . (...) El curso liberador de la Ilustración fue viciado desde el principio y terminó siendo un proceso de alienación y de cosificación. [3] Por tanto, se ponen en escena los sentimientos morales de la compasión y la solidaridad política para abordar una nueva perspectiva ética que define un imperativo existencial capaz de ver la miseria humana y la búsqueda de la felicidad, con el propósito de superar las condiciones y realidades de esta época en estado de indigencia. (shrink)

A Richard Rorty se le considera hoy en día como uno de los filósofos más importantes de Norteamérica. Es posible que esta afirmación sea discutible; lo indiscutible es que, a juicio de los críticos, es el mejor escritor filosófico después de Bertrand Russell….

Normal 0 21 false false false ES-CO X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 My aim in this paper is first to develop the question raised by Habermas concerning the possibilities of a history of philosophy oriented to praxis. This line of analysis will let see the internal connection between theory and praxis within the framework of a materialistic understanding of philosophy. Secondly, I will show how this question becomes a reconstruction of historical materialism in the context of an analysis of the processes which (...) characterise social transformations. With this background Habermas moves from the paradigm of production to that of language seeking a foundation Theory of Communicative Action. Reconstruction, historical materialism,systemic interaction, social interaction, production paradigm, language paradigm. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that defeasible inferences are occasion-sensitive: the inferential connections of a given claim depend on features of the circumstances surrounding the occasion of inference. More specifically, it is an occasion-sensitive matter which possible defeaters have to be considered explicitly by the premises of an inference and which possible defeaters may remain unconsidered, without making the inference enthymematic. As a result, a largely unexplored form of occasion-sensitivity arises in inferentialist theories of content that appeal to defeasible inferences.

This paper presents a learning theory pertinent to dynamic decision making (DDM) called instancebased learning theory (IBLT). IBLT proposes five learning mechanisms in the context of a decision‐making process: instance‐based knowledge, recognition‐based retrieval, adaptive strategies, necessity‐based choice, and feedback updates. IBLT suggests in DDM people learn with the accumulation and refinement of instances, containing the decision‐making situation, action, and utility of decisions. As decision makers interact with a dynamic task, they recognize a situation according to its similarity to past instances, (...) adapt their judgment strategies from heuristic‐based to instance‐based, and refine the accumulated knowledge according to feedback on the result of their actions. The IBLT's learning mechanisms have been implemented in an ACT‐R cognitive model. Through a series of experiments, this paper shows how the IBLT's learning mechanisms closely approximate the relative trend magnitude and performance of human data. Although the cognitive model is bounded within the context of a dynamic task, the IBLT is a general theory of decision making applicable to other dynamic environments. (shrink)

Ascriptions of rationality are related to our practices of praising and criticizing. This seems to provide motivation for normative accounts of rationality, more specifically for the view that rationality is a matter of responding to normative reasons. However, rational agents are sometimes guided by false beliefs. This is problematic for those reasons-based accounts of rationality that are also committed to the widespread thesis that normative reasons are facts. The critical aim of the paper is to present objections to recent proposed (...) solutions to this problem, according to which the responses of deceived agents would be rationalized by facts about how things appear to them. My positive aim is to argue that accounts of reasons in terms of apparent reasons manage to capture the intuitions that seem to favor a normative account of rationality. (shrink)

En los últimos 20 años el debate entre los Factores Comunes y los Tratamientos con Apoyo Empírico (TAE) ha sido uno de los más relevantes para la práctica clínica. El enfoque TAE con origen en la investigación sobre fármacos (Medicina Basada en la Evidencia), promueve el uso de técnicas específicas y protocolos de tratamiento. Los Factores Comunes, por el contrario, señalan la validez de múltiples psicoterapias, la cual estaría basada en dimensiones comunes a todo tratamiento, y no tanto en el (...) uso de técnicas específicas. El proceder médico y farmacológico encaja razonablemente dentro de un marco de acción instrumental, en el que el acto sanitario se ejerce a fin de modificar ciertos parámetros fisiológico-anatómicos. Pero la psicoterapia es mejor entendida como una relación entre sujetos, ya que el paciente, el objeto de la acción terapéutica, es también un sujeto, y no un parámetro. Por ello los protocolos como secuencias prefijadas de acciones del terapeuta (ideal para la investigación por su replicabilidad y pertinencia metodológica), implican una suerte de eliminación del sujeto. Cabe entonces entender el sentido de los protocolos de tratamiento como marcos de sentido, de problemas pertinentes, de soluciones indicadas. Como una forma de conocimiento flexible sobre el problema y su funcionamiento y manejo. (shrink)

This paper discusses practical akrasia from the perspective of the sophisticated form of moral subjectivism that can be derived from Nuno Venturinha’s (2018) remarks on moral matters.

The objective of this research is to develop accurate forecasting models for chlorophyll-α concentrations at various depths in El Mar Menor, Spain. Chlorophyll-α plays a crucial role in assessing eutrophication in this vulnerable ecosystem. To achieve this objective, various deep learning forecasting techniques, including long short-term memory, bidirectional long short-term memory and gated recurrent uni networks, were utilized. The models were designed to forecast the chlorophyll-α levels with a 2-week prediction horizon. To enhance the models’ accuracy, a sliding window method (...) combined with a blocked cross-validation procedure for time series was also applied to these techniques. Two input strategies were also tested in this approach: using only chlorophyll-α time series and incorporating exogenous variables. The proposed approach significantly improved the accuracy of the predictive models, no matter the forecasting technique employed. Results were remarkable, with |$\overline{\sigma}$| values reaching approximately 0.90 for the 0.5-m depth level and 0.80 for deeper levels. The proposed forecasting models and methodologies have great potential for predicting eutrophication episodes and acting as decision-making tools for environmental agencies. Accurate prediction of eutrophication episodes through these models could allow for proactive measures to be implemented, resulting in improved environmental management and the preservation of the ecosystem. (shrink)

La crítica horkheimeriana a la Ilustración muestra el proceso mediante el cual se desencadena la desmitificación del mundo por vía de un "acto de dominio" de la razón. Allí, el hombre perdió para la razón su posibilidad de autocrítica, haciendo que esta deviniera en razón instrumental. Desde sus comienzos, la Ilustración, en calidad de mito, mutiló la razón y, por encima de la búsqueda de la verdad -verdad teórica y verdad moral-, aconteció una "renuncia al sentido" donde el sueño de (...) la racionalidad ilustrada quedó reducido a la "instrumentalización". Esta dialéctica no solo devela la crisis irreversible de la razón, sino que deja vigente, en la discusión de la teoría crítica, la idea de una "patología social de la razón", a partir de la cual puede proponerse la reivindicación de un "horizonte normativo"; dejando entrever en el escenario de la discusión ética la falta de racionalidad de las sociedades. Horkheimerian's critique of the Enlightenment, shows the process whereby the demystification of the world is triggered by way of an "an act of sovereignty" of reason. There the man lost for reason his possibility of self-criticism, causing it to be in instrumental reason. Since its inception, the Enlightenment, as myth, mutilated reason, over the pursuit of truth -theoretical truth and moral truth-, there was a renounce to sense. The dream of Enlightenment rationality was reduced to the 'instrumentalization'. This dialectic not only reveals the irreversible crisis of reason, but leaves in place, in the discussion of critical theory, the idea of the 'social pathology of reason', from which a "normative horizon" can be proposed, hinting at the scene of the ethical discussion the lack of rationality of societies. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Anti-normativists have advanced the view that the involvement of content in norms is not an essential feature of content, but a contingent feature or side effect of the normativity governing attitudes. In this paper, we argue that, in its original formulation, this view puts too much weight on the idea that belief is the fundamental, and perhaps the only, source of content-involving normativity. In its more refined formulation, however, the view does not make justice to a neutral and encompassing (...) characterization of what it is for content to be essentially normative. (shrink)

Selected-effects theories provide the most popular account of biological teleology. According to these theories, the purpose of a trait is to do whatever it was selected for. The vast majority of selected-effects theories consider biological teleology to be introduced by natural selection. We want to argue, however, that natural selection is not the only relevant selective process in biology. In particular, our proposal is that biological regulation is a form of biological selection. So, those who accept selected-effects theories should recognize (...) biological regulation as a distinctive source of biological teleology. The purposes derived from biological regulation are of special interest for explaining and predicting the behavior of organisms, given that regulatory mechanisms directly modulate the behavior of the systems they regulate. This explanatory power, added to the fact that regulation is widespread in the biological world, makes the idea that regulation gives rise to its own form of teleology a substantial contribution to the debate on biological teleology. (shrink)

There is an interesting contrast between permissions to act and permissions to believe. Plausibly, if it is permissible to believe something from a perspective with incomplete evidence, it cannot become impermissible to believe it from a second perspective with complete evidence. In contrast, it seems that something permissible to do for an agent in a perspective with limited evidence can become impermissible in a second perspective in which all the relevant evidence is available. What is more, an agent with incomplete (...) evidence may be permitted to do something that she knows would be impermissible if she occupied a perspective of complete evidence. In this paper, I argue that this contrast is explained by a disanalogy between the role played by belief in epistemic deliberation and the role played by action in practical deliberation. Epistemic deliberation may be closed by adopting other attitudes than belief, whereas in general, practical deliberation can only be closed by endorsing some course of action. Thus, when there are pressures to close some practical deliberation, agents have to make a decision about what to do even if they lack relevant information. By contrast, lacking relevant evidence, agents may always refrain from forming a belief and close instead their epistemic deliberation by adopting some other attitude. (shrink)

ABSTRACTSeveral authors have claimed that indicative conditionals are sensitive to the epistemic perspective of agents. According to this sort of view, the truth of an indicative conditional depends on the background evidence of some relevant agent or group of agents. In this paper, I argue that the context-dependence of indicative conditionals goes beyond this. Indicative conditionals are not only sensitive to the evidence of agents, but also to contextual factors that determine what is inferable from such background evidence. More specifically, (...) my proposal is that when the inference associated with a conditional is defeasible, the truth of that conditional is sensitive to practical stakes. (shrink)

El presente escrito tiene la motivación de arrojar algo de luz sobre una dificultad intrínseca a la función social que cumple el Derecho: el manejo de la diversidad. En particular, la diversidad psicosocial ha supuesto históricamente un obstáculo persistente a la configuración de un molde jurídico que permita incluir en él todo el espectro de la realidad. El argumento que vehicula la exposición es que el carácter irresoluble de esta tensión conduce a la criminalización de una subjetividad que escapa a (...) la pulsión normalizadora del sistema. Abordando las diferentes coyunturas que tratan, sin éxito, de disolver todas las diferencias en su seno se intentará demostrar la incompatibilidad de este proceso con la realización plena de los individuos. (shrink)

Este artículo reseña: Leigh A. PAYNE, Gabriel PEREIRA y Laura BERNAL-BERMÚDEZ, Justicia transicional y rendición de cuentas de actores económicos, desde abajo: desplegando la palanca de Arquímedes, Dejusticia, Bogotá, 2021, 486 pp.

Mi objetivo en este texto es obtener ciertos rendimientos que sirvan para desarrollar una comprensión de la necesidad práctica dentro de la filosofía moral de Kant por medio de una discusión, principalmente, con la interpretación de Scarano. En esta última se busca establecer algún tipo de identidad entre necesidad práctica y necesidad teórica, con lo cual se reduce la primera a una forma puramente lógica, descuidando así el carácter propiamente práctico que también la constituye. Mi propuesta alternativa tiene como clave (...) la mención a la voluntad divina en la explicación por parte de Kant sobre qué significa que la ley moral sea válida para todo ente racional. Esta mención nos permite comprender, al menos en principio, que la necesidad práctica es aquella con la cual actuaría una voluntad divina de acuerdo con la ley moral. En nuestro caso, como además de la razón tenemos la inclinación como fundamento de determinación de la acción, no necesariamente actuamos de acuerdo con la ley moral, pero debemos hacerlo, de modo que la ley moral es constrictiva para nosotros. (shrink)

My aim is to discuss the impact of higher-order evidence on aesthetic appreciation. I suggest that this impact is different with respect to aesthetic beliefs and to aesthetic affective attitudes (such as enjoyment). More specifically, I defend the view that higher-order evidence questioning the reliability of one’s aesthetic beliefs can make it reasonable for one to revise those beliefs. Conversely, in line with a plausible account of emotions, aesthetic affective attitudes are not directly sensitive to this type of higher-order evidence; (...) they are sensitive only to those features of objects that make such attitudes (un)fitting. Thus, I argue, there are cases of non-defective recalcitrant aesthetic attitudes where the subject has both a non-defective, fitting aesthetic affective attitude and a reasonable belief questioning the fittingness of this attitude. I further discuss whether, in this type of case, the subject has decisive reasons to try to change her recalcitrant attitudes—say by trying to modify her aesthetic affective dispositions. My answer is negative. Even granting that subjects always have aesthetic reasons to try to avoid aesthetically unfitting attitudes, these can be outweighed by further reasons not to do so—perhaps including aesthetic reasons related to the construction of valuable aesthetic identities or to the value of aesthetic engagement. (shrink)

Aberrations introduced by the atmospheric turbulence in large telescopes are compensated using adaptive optics systems, where the use of deformable mirrors and multiple sensors relies on complex control systems. Recently, the development of larger scales of telescopes as the E-ELT or TMT has created a computational challenge due to the increasing complexity of the new adaptive optics systems. The Complex Atmospheric Reconstructor based on Machine Learning is an algorithm based on artificial neural networks, designed to compensate the atmospheric turbulence. During (...) recent years, the use of GPUs has been proved to be a great solution to speed up the learning process of neural networks, and different frameworks have been created to ease their development. The implementation of CARMEN in different Multi-GPU frameworks is presented in this paper, along with its development in a language originally developed for GPU, like CUDA. This implementation offers the best response for all the presented cases, although its advantage of using more than one GPU occurs only in large networks. (shrink)

Traditional expressivists want to preserve a contrast between the representational use of declarative sentences in descriptive domains and the non-representational use of declarative sentences in other areas of discourse. However, expressivists have good reasons to endorse minimalism about representational notions, and minimalism seems to threaten the existence of such a bifurcation. Thus, there are pressures for expressivists to become global anti-representationalists. In this paper I discuss how to reconstruct in non-representationalist terms the sort of bifurcation traditional expressivists were after. My (...) proposal is that the relevant bifurcation can be articulated by appeal to the contrast between relativistic and non-relativistic assertoric practices. I argue that this contrast, which can be specified without appeal to representational notions, captures the core intuitions behind the expressivist bifurcation. (shrink)

Scarcity acts as a mental burden that disrupts how people process information and make decisions (Mullainathan and Shafir in Scarcity: Why having too little means so much. Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2013; Mani et al. Science 342:976–980, 2013). In this study, we replicated Mani et al.’s (Science 342:976–980, 2013) experimental design to explore whether scarcity also taxes Colombian high school students’ mental bandwidth. In a lab-in-the-field experiment, we tested how 417 high school students from high and low socioeconomic status (SES) in Bogotá, (...) Colombia, responded to different scarcity situations. Students were first presented with hypothetical scenarios of harsh or soft scarcity. Next, participants had to solve a series of tasks that measured higher cognitive functions (i.e. Raven’s Progressive Matrices, Cognitive Reflection Task and questions to assess their Delay Discounting value) and had to explain how they would solve the scarcity situation. As opposed to Mani et al. (Science 342:976–980, 2013), we did not find that scarcity taxed individuals’ mental bandwidth, neither their cognitive nor executive functions. We found that low-SES individuals, under the harsh scarcity condition, displayed more empathic attributes than high-SES individuals. Taken together, the results of this study show the importance of replication in different cultures and environments. (shrink)